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CIA 588103

CONTROLS:S E C R E T NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL
262235Z CIA 588103TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE//INR, DIA WASHINGTON DC,
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA,
DEPT OF COMMERCE.

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PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS SECRET --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

DIST: 26 MARCH 1991

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: BIOGRAPHIC AND PERSONALITY INFORMATION ON CUBAN
OFFICIALS

DOI: JANUARY 1991

SOURCE: (THIS REPORT RESULTS FROM CONTACT BETWEEN A U.S. CITIZEN AND SEVERAL
CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO MOST CERTAINLY EXPECTED THEIR REMARKS TO REACH
U.S. OFFICIALS.)

TEXT: 1. JORGE ((RISQUET)) VALDEZ SALVANA, A MEMBER OF THE POLITIBURO OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC), USED AN EARLY JANUARY 1991 CONFERENCE ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS TO LAMBAST THE U.S. FOR NOT INCLUDING CUBA AS AN EQUAL PARTNER IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A WIDE VARIETY OF POLITICAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES. RISQUET, WHO HEADED THE CUBAN DELEGATION TO THE MEETING, STARTED HIS DISCOURSE WITH THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1899 AND CONTINUED IN A VITRIOLIC VEIN UNTIL HE REACHED THE LATE 1980S, WHEN THE U.S. RESISTED INCLUDING CUBA IN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN AND SOVIET TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. (SOURCE COMMENT: IN PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS, RISQUET

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GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS UNREPENTANT AND UNREFORMED--THAT HE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY UNAFFECTED BY CHANGES IN COMMUNIST AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHY, PARTICULARLY IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE.) JORGE ((POLLO)) GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PCC, SPEAKING PRIVATELY IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, SAID THAT RISQUET HAD "GONE OFF ON HIS OWN" DURING THIS SPEECH AND THAT HIS VIEWS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THE OFFICIAL CUBAN POSITION. POLLO WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO ASSUAGE THE CONCERNS OF A WESTERN PARTICIPANT IN THE MEETING.

COMMENT: IT WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTING THAT POLLO, WHO NEVER SPOKE DURING THE CONFERENCE AND WHO SEEMED TO BE THERE IN THE ROLE OF ASSISTANT, WAS THE ONE SENT OUT TO UNDERCUT THE DELEGATION HEAD. THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION LEFT BY POLLO WAS THAT RISQUET IS CONSIDERED A HEAVYHANDED LOOSE CANNON.)

2. DURING ANOTHER PRIVATE DISCUSSION, RAFAEL ((HERNANDEZ)), CENTER FOR AMERICAN STUDIES, CONVEYED MUCH THE SAME MESSAGE. HERNANDEZ TERMED RISQUET AN "OLD THINKER WHO IS CERTAINLY NOT IN THE LIBERAL WING OF THE LEADERSHIP." HERNANDEZ ALSO SUGGESTED THAT RISQUET IS ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE INNER CIRCLE. THE LOSS OF HIS POSITION AS PARTY SECRETARY DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT RISQUET WAS NOT IMPORTANT, HERNANDEZ SAID, BUT SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT RISQUET IS NO LONGER AS INFLUENTIAL AS HE ONCE WAS. (SOURCE COMMENT: DURING A SIMILAR MEETING IN MOSCOW DURING LATE 1989, RISQUET MADE A POINT OF GIVING FORMER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANDREY ((GROMYKO)) A BEAR HUG; GROMYKO'S FACE WAS FILLED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF DISGUST.)

3. SERGIO ((DEL VALLE)) JIMENEZ DID NOT PARTICIPATE EXTENSIVELY IN THE MEETING, DESPITE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED INTEREST ON HIS PART. DEL VALLE GAVE A REPORT, IN SPANISH, ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT AND THEN FADED FROM THE SCENE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: DEL VALLE WAS VICE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM 1961 TO 1968. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SERVED AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, 1968-1979, AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 1979-1985.) ANOTHER CUBAN PARTICIPANT INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT RUMORS HAVE SURROUNDED DEL VALLE SINCE HE LEFT HIS MINISTERIAL POSITION. THESE RUMORS, ACCORDING TO THE CUBAN OFFICIAL, HAVE FOCUSED CHIEFLY ON THE FACT THAT DEL VALLE WAS CONSIDERED NOT TOUGH ENOUGH FOR THE JOB. COMMENT: FOR WHATEVER REASON, DEL VALLE SEEMED TO STEER CLEAR OF THE REST OF HIS DELEGATION AND THEY STAYED AWAY FROM HIM; THIS WAS NOTABLE BECAUSE THE REST OF THE GROUP GENERALLY STAYED TOGETHER. THIS SHOULD BE CONTRASTED WITH DEL VALLE'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE 1989 MOSCOW CONFERENCE, WHEN HE WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CUBAN GROUP.)

4. BRIGADIER GENERAL FABIAN ((ESCALANTE)) FONT, PCC-CC, WHO INITIALLY WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE VICE MINISTER OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BUT LATER AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING. ESCALANTE SPEAKS NEITHER RUSSIAN NOR ENGLISH, THEREFORE REQUIRING A TRANSLATOR.) ESCALANTE SAID THAT HE IS THE NEPHEW OF ANIBEL ((ESCALANTE)), WHO WAS PURGED IN 1962, WENT TO MOSCOW, WAS REHABILITATED, RETURNED TO CUBA, AND FINALLY PURGED AGAIN IN 1968. ESCALANTE'S FATHER WAS A LEADER OF THE INTEGRATED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION (ORI). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE ORI WAS THE PRECURSOR OF THE PRESENT-DAY PCC.) THESE POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH HIS RELATIVES DID NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR ESCALANTE, HE SAID PROUDLY, BECAUSE CUBANS ARE ABOVE MAKING PEOPLE SUFFER FOR THE FLAWS OF THEIR FAMILY. WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

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AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, ESCALANTE SAID THAT HE WAS "HEAD OF COUNTERESPIONAGE OF A SECTOR" AND THEN EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS CHIEF OF COUNTERESPIONAGE FOR THE U.S. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ESCALANTE LOOKS TOO YOUNG TO HAVE HELD THAT POSITION IN 1961 OR, ALTERNATELY, HE HAS BEEN VERY WELL PRESERVED.) ESCALANTE INDICATED THAT HE MADE A PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OF CUBAN EMIGRE CAMPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA IN OCTOBER 1960 AND DESCRIBED THE TRIP IN SOME DETAIL. HE ADMITTED THAT CUBA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR A NUMBER OF UPRISINGS IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE 1960S AND THAT IT DID IN FACT INSTIGATE SOME REVOLUTIONS WHICH NEVER QUITE GOT OFF THE GROUND, INCLUDING ONE IN VENEZUELA. CUBA WAS NOT, HOWEVER, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAMOUS 1962 ARMS CACHE. CUBA DID SUPPLY THE SANDANISTAS, ESCALANTE STATED.

5. ESCALANTE BOASTED THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR "INTERROGATING" ALL SUSPECT "CIA AGENTS" DURING THE 1960S. ALONG THESE LINES, ESCALANTE SAID THAT THERE WAS EXTENSIVE CUBAN INFILTRATION OF U.S. ACTIVITIES IN MIAMI DURING THE 1960S, INCLUDING THE MONGOOSE PROGRAM. WHEN ASKED HOW MANY CUBAN AGENTS WERE IN MIAMI AT THE TIME, ESCALANTE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW SPECIFICS. IN FACT, HE SAID, NO ONE DOES BECAUSE CUBAN RECORDS FROM THE PERIOD WERE SO HAPHAZARD. HOWEVER, HE STATED ASSURINGLY THERE WAS NO HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN ASSET IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN 1962, ALTHOUGH HE QUALIFIED THIS BY ADDING THAT HE HAS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF "POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE" ACTIVITIES ABROAD. ESCALANTE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES "SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CIA OPERATIONAL ARM" IN COMBINATION WITH THE MAFIA WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF U.S. PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.

ADMIN:

ACQ: (JANUARY 1991)

DISSEM: FIELD: NONE.

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